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3 Abstract 
Abstract 
Why is it that some separatist movements remain united while others fragment into 
competing factions? While one would expect supporters of a separatist movement to be 
united in the struggle against their common enemy, the state, recent literature has shown 
that they often spend valuable time and resources on internal rivalries – yet little research 
has been done to explain this phenomenon. Based on a comparison of the cases of the 
Armenians in Azerbaijan, the Chechens in Russia, and the Abkhaz in their struggle with 
Georgia, this thesis shows that the ability of the separatist movement to establish 
institutions capable of providing effective governance is essential in understanding 
processes of cohesion and fragmentation. It further illustrates that the strength of the 
incumbent state as well as the amount of external support a separatist movement receives 
play into these processes in important ways. Future research will have to show whether 
these variables hold the same explanatory power in other contexts. 
Keywords: fragmentation, governance, institutions, separatism 
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7 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
Ignoring that ethnic identities are fluid and malleable, researchers of civil war tend to 
treat ethnic groups as unitary actors that possess a single set of preferences and act 
accordingly (Kalyvas, 2008). Due to this conflation of different individuals and 
organizations into a single actor, the dynamics internal to ethnic groups have long been 
overlooked – but a variety of scholars recently demonstrated the importance of studying 
these comparative dynamics (e.g. Asal et al., 2012; Bakke et al., 2012). The number and 
heterogeneity of actors in ethnic groups namely affect strategies as well as outcomes in 
civil wars, for example through their impact on (1) the group’s ability to bargain with the 
central government (Cunningham, 2011); (2) the group’s likelihood to use violence and 
the targets of this violence (Cunningham et al., 2012); (3) rebel leaders’ ability to develop 
effective governance systems (Mampilly, 2011); (4) peace negotiations and the likelihood 
of their success (Pearlman, 2009); and (5) the effects of resource flows (Staniland, 2012).  
The internal divisions of ethnic groups are thus central to understanding civil war 
processes, and to answering key questions in Comparative Politics and International 
Relations. The aim of this thesis is to answer one of these questions, namely: why does 
fragmentation in separatist movements occur? Answering this question is first of all 
important in theoretical terms, because filling this knowledge gap would improve our 
understanding of separatist movements as actors as well as of (pre-)civil war dynamics. 
But more importantly, discovering the roots of separatist movements’ internal divisions 
is important because it could allow the actors involved to make targeted changes to the 
ways or conditions under which a separatist movement operates. As such, the process of 
fragmentation can either be stimulated or countered, depending on whether the aim is to 
decrease or increase its effectiveness. 
While the internal variation of any ethnic group produces an interesting process of 
interaction, the dynamics of cohesion and fragmentation in secessionist movements1 are 
particularly puzzling. One would expect supporters of a separatist movement to be 
united in the struggle against their common enemy, the state – but instead, they often 
spend valuable time and resources on internal rivalries (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012). 
Although fragmentation is present in most secessionist movements, some movements 
are more fragmented than others. Why is it that some movements remain united while 
                                                 
1  Throughout this thesis, I use the terms secessionist movement, separatist movement, and self-
determination movement interchangeably.  
 
8 The Enemy Within 
others fragment into competing factions? Based on a comparison of the cases of the 
Armenians in Azerbaijan, the Chechens in Russia, and the Abkhaz in their struggle with 
Georgia, I will argue that the ability of the separatist movement to establish institutions 
capable of providing effective governance is essential in understanding processes of 
cohesion and fragmentation. In addition, the strength of the incumbent state as well as 
the amount of external support a separatist movement receives play into these processes 
in important ways. 
In the next chapter, I will continue with a review of the relevant literature. Consequently, 
chapter 3 will give an overview of my theoretical framework, followed by the research 
design in chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I will provide an in-depth analysis and discussion of 
different separatist movements in Azerbaijan, Russia, and Georgia, followed up with my 
conclusions and recommendations in chapter 6. 
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2 Literature review 
Because scholarly interest in the concept of fragmentation has emerged only recently, 
there is very little literature available to explain variation in movement fragmentation. I 
will therefore first review several articles that address the importance of cleavages in 
general, and then move on to a discussion of the related processes of infighting, ethnic 
defection, and organizational splintering.  
2.1 Alternative explanations 
Internal cleavages have long been neglected in civil war literature. Traditionally, both the 
state and the group that challenges it namely tend to be perceived as unitary actors, 
therefore treating the struggle they are involved in as a binary conflict that should be 
analyzed on the macro level. While this used to be the ‘standard’ way of analyzing violent 
conflicts, Stathis Kalyvas’ 2003 article The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity 
in Civil Wars generated a turn to micropolitics, bringing to the attention that local-level 
cleavages internal to the warring parties are key to understanding civil war dynamics. Part 
of the violence in civil war contexts is namely unrelated to the central conflict between the 
two actors, as violent interaction also takes place within them. Indeed, “[a]ctions ‘on the 
ground’ often turn out to be related to local and private conflicts rather than the war’s 
driving (or ‘master’) cleavage” (Kalyvas, 2003: 475). This implies that the dominant 
discourse of the war is manipulated to legitimize the settlement of private scores, or the 
achievement of private gains. As such, the multiple agendas of participants in secessionist 
movements create a complex interplay between collective and private motives, with 
interesting effects on the pattern of fragmentation in separatist movements.  
Self-determination movements’ internal cleavages thus leave an important mark on the 
conflicts these movements are engaged in, adding a second layer of contestation. As 
formulated by Kristin Bakke and her colleagues, “fragmentation will have consequences 
for any movement that acts in the pursuit of a collective interest on behalf of a particular 
group, as each organization within the overarching movement finds itself in a ‘dual 
contest’: a contest in the pursuit of the common good for the group as a whole and a 
contest over private advantages with other factions in the movement” (Bakke et al., 2012: 
266). In other words, different organizations within a self-determination movement are 
embroiled simultaneously in a struggle for independence with the state, and in a battle 
over political relevance with each other. While the first is concerned with the public good 
of self-determination that potentially benefits the group as a whole, the second is about 
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private goods such as power and material gains that benefit faction leaders and 
supporters and are not shared between different factions (Cunningham et al., 2012).  
Indeed, Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) make a related argument concerning rebels’ motives 
for infighting. They namely argue that infighting is “a means to secure material resources 
and political leverage that can help the group prevail in the conflict with the government” 
(Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012: 604). More specifically, Christia (2008) argues that economic 
motives can generate willingness among people to fight their coethnics if there are local 
elites that can ensure the survival of their constituents as well as provide them access to 
high economic payoffs. These articles, like the previous ones, thus recognize the fact that 
rebels tend to be motivated not only by ideology or common good, but also make 
rational calculations in order to ensure their survival and maximize profit. In particular, it 
is the pursuit of private motives that explains interrebel violence. Although infighting is a 
process that takes place only after fragmentation has already occurred, private motives 
could potentially be a cause of movement fragmentation as well. More specifically, it 
could be argued inductively that fragmentation takes place because of certain benefits 
associated with faction leadership – in other words, new organizations are established by 
greedy or politically ambitious individuals. 
A second process related to fragmentation is ethnic defection. Ethnic defection is 
defined by Kalyvas (2008) as “a process whereby individuals join organizations explicitly 
opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end 
up fighting against their coethnics” (Kalyvas, 2008: 1045). His subsequent argument is 
that ethnic defection is a demand-driven process, depending on the incumbent actors’ 
resources and level of organization. Once the structures to facilitate defection are in place, 
the process tends to be spurred by dynamics endogenous to the war, particularly the 
expansion of territorial control and the logic of revenge. Hypothetically, it is possible that 
these factors in broader terms (i.e. demand and the endogenous processes of civil war) 
not only facilitate ethnic defection but also contribute to the emergence of multiple 
organizations representing the same separatist movement. Staniland (2012a) recognizes 
that existing explanations for defection identify state policy and ideology as key 
mechanisms, but argues instead that the main trigger for defection is fratricide of rivals. 
Applying the same logic to the process of fragmentation, it is possible that fratricide by a 
separatist organization also explains the establishment of oppositional organizations.  
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Regarding organizational splintering, then, Asal and his colleagues (2012) asked 
themselves why splits emerge in formal organizations that claim to represent ethnic 
groups. Testing different hypotheses on a dataset including 112 ethnopolitical 
organizations in the Middle East, they find that factional leadership and the use of 
violence have a positive and statistically significant impact on organizational splintering. 
Paul Staniland (2012b) in turn points out that previous research has shown on the one 
hand that resource flows can undermine organizational discipline and as such result in 
organizational fragmentation – but on the other hand, different scholars have argued that 
resources rather facilitate organization building. Resource wealth on its own thus does 
not determine whether an organization fragments or coheres. Instead, Staniland finds 
that it is the structure of the preexisting social networks upon which an organization is 
built that determines its integration or fragmentation, claiming that divided social bases 
create fragmented organizations. Even though both of these research projects provide 
interesting insights in organizational schism, the fact that their unit of analysis is the 
organization rather than the movement implies that the scope of their research is more 
limited than the fragmentation process this research paper addresses: it namely does not 
consider organizations that emerge independently from already existing ones.  
Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour (2012), in addition to stating that organizational 
factors such as discipline and internal control are essential to the maintenance of 
organizational unity, do make several predictions about the potential factors that lead to 
the emergence of multiple organizations competing to represent the group:  
In addition to any divergence over interests and strategy, intragroup pluralism, particularly 
as a legacy of local political competition, ideological divides, or social and geographic 
cleavages, is a primary source of division—just as social structures may shape political party 
factionalism. […] Processes endogenous to conflict, such as leadership rivalries, counter-
insurgency strategies aimed at divide-and-rule or leadership decapitation, and the shift from 
guerilla warfare waged by small, isolated groups to large-scale conventional warfare, can 
also be linked to changes in the number of organizations. Conversely, a process of factional 
amalgamation, the preferences of external patrons for unity, or solidarity in the face of 
repression from a common enemy can decrease the number of independent groups. (Bakke 
et al., 2012: 269) 
Their article focuses on defining fragmentation rather than identifying its causes, 
however, and therefore no evidence confirming these predictions is presented. As none 
of the research projects covered in the existing literature thus specifically addresses the 
causes of movement fragmentation, theory development on this topic is necessary.   
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2.2 The importance of institutions: examples from Dagestan 
Why does fragmentation in separatist movements occur? As the above overview of 
alternative explanations shows, there are many different factors at play in separatist 
struggles, varying from greed to fratricide to social networks. It is very much possible 
that every single one of these factors contributes to the fragmentation of secessionist 
movements. As argued by Chapman and Roeder (2007), however, political institutions 
hold primacy over these factors, as they shape identities, motivations, means, and 
opportunities. Indeed, Roeder (2007) illustrates this primacy with his segmental institutions 
thesis, through which he shows that the success of nation-state projects ultimately 
depends on the institutions of the incumbent state and its challenger. Institutions come 
first in the causal chain and align the other factors. Therefore, the institutions established 
by self-determination movements will be the focal point of this thesis. 
To illustrate how institutions indeed hold primacy over identities, opportunities, 
motivations, and means – categories that encompass all the different alternative 
explanations – I will provide some examples from the ethnonationalist movement in 
Dagestan, Russia, a movement that faced the same conditions as the cases discussed in 
this thesis. Due to its high degree of ethnic diversity, Dagestan can be considered a least 
likely case for group cohesion – but thanks to its effective institutions, it nonetheless 
maintained unity. Starting with identities, the case of Dagestan shows that institutions 
can prevent intragroup pluralism from developing into a fragmented society. People 
namely take on multiple, nonexclusive identities, and institutions have the potential to 
prioritize one common identity over multiple competing ones. In Dagestan, a region 
home to 30 different national groups, institutions were shaped around a system of ethnic 
power sharing that was intended specifically to accommodate different preferences, while 
simultaneously emphasizing common goals. These institutions facilitated the emergence 
of a multilayered identity that allowed for diverging ethnic ties on one level, while 
creating an overarching Dagestani identity on a higher level. As a result of this successful 
strategy, “most Dagestani identified first and foremost with being ‘Dagestani’ rather than 
as a member of an ethnic group” (Zürcher, 2007: 193).  
Despite the presence of a common identity, ethnic diversity in Dagestan could still have 
provided an opportunity for fragmentation in the absence of institutions that limited the 
ability to mobilize people along these lines. As Zürcher explains, “Dagestan might still 
have fallen victim to intercommunal violence were it not for the interlocking of 
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institutions that, together, made ethnonational mobilization difficult. More specifically, 
the inherited Soviet practices of ethnic power sharing, a new constitution that provided 
elements of a consociational democracy, and a traditional societal organization based on 
territorially defined (rather than ethnically defined) communities made mobilization 
across ethnic lines difficult and thus enabled Dagestani society to preserve its ethnic 
balance” (Zürcher, 2007: 194). In other words, the Dagestani example shows that 
institutions can successfully eliminate opportunities for fragmentation by constraining 
the opportunities for mobilization.  
Lastly, the case of Dagestan also illustrates how institutions shape motivations and means 
for cohesion and fragmentation, as they are better equipped to channel greed as well as 
grievance. In Dagestan, potential contenders were successfully incorporated into the 
quasi-state system because the institution had the means to buy them off (Zürcher, 2007). 
Indeed, institutions tend to be better endowed with resources as they are the most likely 
beneficiaries of support from diaspora, international organizations, and other states 
(Chapman and Roeder, 2007), and are therefore in the best position to coerce or offer 
private benefits to individuals and other parties. Since economic incentives ultimately 
determine whether an individual participates in one or another organization (Christia, 
2008; Driscoll, 2012; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008), these resources are essential in 
rallying institutional support. Institutions thus channel the means and motives for 
fragmentation, as well as shaping identities and opportunities. Without denying the 
potential relevance of other variables, I will therefore focus on the institutions 
established by separatist movements to explain processes of  cohesion and fragmentation. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
Hoping to avoid the emergence of challengers to its sovereignty, every government aims 
to establish both a position of domination and hegemony in society. Interestingly, when 
challengers do arise, they will often attempt to adopt the exact same positions: they will 
try to reach domination through the establishment of a coercive apparatus, and 
hegemony by gathering a degree of consent from the civilian population (Mampilly, 
2011). In order to gain legitimacy and the support of the inhabitants of the territory they 
wish to control, insurgent organizations thus tend to replicate both the forms and the 
functions of the nation-state, which can be understood as an attempt at ‘counterstate 
sovereignty’ (ibid). To resemble the nation-state’s form, separatist organizations have to 
create an institutional structure that resembles a national government; and to match its 
functions, they should establish a system of effective governance. As shown by 
Zachariah Mampilly in his book Rebel Rulers (2011), a system of effective governance as 
established by insurgent organizations encompasses different aspects. Most importantly, 
the organizations should provide three types of services: security, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and other public goods like education and health care. An additional factor 
of major importance is the development of mechanisms that allow for feedback and 
participation of the population. Although Mampilly argues that civilian representation is 
no requirement for effective governance because it is not essential for the development 
of an effective capacity to provide public goods, I expect that it is essential for the 
maintenance of cohesion in a separatist movement. I therefore consider effective 
governance to consist of two parts: (1) service provision and (2) the institutionalization 
of representation.  
Starting with the first part, different organizations engage in service provision with 
varying degrees of effectiveness. As argued by Mampilly, one of the factors contributing 
to the development of the capacities for service provision is within-group unity, as 
cohesive organizations are more capable of producing and executing cohesive policies. 
Other scholars have shown that the relationship between these factors will also work the 
other way around: service provision by insurgent organizations namely is instrumental to 
increasing popular support (Flanigan, 2008; Magouirk, 2008). In other words, the better a 
separatist government is at providing services in the territory under its control, the more 
likely it is to rally the support of its population and to be accepted as the legitimate 
representative of the movement. Service provision and cohesion are thus mutually 
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reinforcing. Indeed, Mampilly recognizes that “insurgent organizations with a 
secessionist or ethnonationalist agenda have a vested interest in proving their ability to 
serve as de facto governments in areas they come to control as their ability to garner 
support from a specific population will be directly shaped by their governance 
performance” (Mampilly, 2011: 76). If a separatist government is considered both 
effective and legitimate, there will be less motives for members of the movement to 
found or support oppositional factions. As such, effective service provision will lower 
the likelihood of fragmentation. 
H1: The more effective a separatist organization’s service provision, the lower the likelihood of 
fragmentation.  
Whether a secessionist organization succeeds at the provision of services also depends on 
the organization’s interactions with a variety of social and political actors, which emerge 
from three different levels: from below, from within, and from above. All of these actors 
have their own preferences regarding the governmental structures set up by the separatist 
government, which is why the institutionalization of representation, the second aspect of 
effective governance, is also important. From below, separatist governments face 
pressures from the inhabitants of the area under their control, as civilians try to shape the 
system of governance to meet their own needs. In order to ensure that their interests are 
not neglected, civilians tend to use their ability to express either support for or discontent 
with a specific rebel organization strategically (Mampilly, 2011). If their interests are not 
considered, civilians will encourage competing organizations to challenge the separatist 
government’s rule through expressions of discontent. In other words, a lack of 
institutional mechanisms for popular representation will foster the emergence of 
oppositional organizations that claim to do a better job at representing the interests of 
the population, and as such spur a process of movement fragmentation. Conversely, 
when institutional structures do allow for civilian representation, consequent popular 
support for the separatist government will discourage the founding of other 
organizations because there is no demand for them within the target society. As such, 
cohesion is promoted. A separatist government should therefore aim at the 
establishment of an institutional structure in which civilian interests are represented, so as 
to promote the expression of support rather than discontent – and cohesion rather than 
fragmentation.  
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When popular expressions of opposition lead to the emergence of competing 
organizations, individuals suddenly are no longer the only stakeholders demanding 
representation. These challengers from within constitute the second type of interactions. 
As discussed earlier, separatist movements are not unitary, but rather consist of different 
individuals and groups with a variety of perspectives and preferences. Therefore, “full 
hierarchical control within any organization is never possible; some degree of tensions 
between internal factions is inevitable” (ibid: 79). But while organizations in some 
movements develop themselves as governments and establish institutional structures 
through which they subjugate competing factions or incorporate them into a single 
command, other movements remain divided by multiple rivals that vie for control. The 
implications of the relationship between internal competition and legitimate 
representation are twofold. Firstly, the greater the extent to which an insurgent 
organization manages to establish a unified command and limit rivalry within the 
movement, the greater the likelihood that the organization will develop a legitimate 
representational system. In the absence of opposition, an organization can namely devote 
more time and resources to the development of institutional structures as opposed to 
eliminating potential competitors. Secondly, if an organization fails to accommodate the 
preferences of different factions in the design of its system of legitimate representation, it 
is likely that ruptures will emerge. As argued by Pearlman (2009), a separatist government 
has to create an institutionalized system of legitimate representation in order to avoid the 
emergence of fractions within a separatist movement. When the legitimacy of such a 
system is established, all factions will accept the right of the organization to speak on 
behalf of the collective, and will be ensured that their needs are adequately met. This can 
neutralize potential motives for opposition. As such, an adequate structure of 
representation is instrumental to the maintenance of unity within a movement. If a 
separatist government succeeds at institutionalizing both popular and organizational 
demands for representation, it is less likely to face the emergence of opposition. 
H2: The stronger the institutionalization of representation, the lower the likelihood of fragmentation. 
The third type of interactions, then, which emerge from above, are the interactions 
between separatist organizations and transnational actors. By providing security and 
other public goods to the population, secessionist organizations can gain support 
(material as well as nonmaterial) and legitimacy from transnational actors such as 
international agencies, NGOs, and states. These resources will give them a comparative 
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advantage over potential rivals, providing separatist governments that promote effective 
governance the opportunity to outperform and consequently eliminate opposing factions. 
As such, transnational actors, too, play into the relationship between effective 
governance and movement fragmentation. If a separatist organization is able to attract 
large amounts of external support, this will enhance its capabilities to establish effective 
governance structures, and as a result less challengers will emerge. Organizations that 
receive little or no external support, on the other hand, will have much more difficulty 
with the establishment of an elaborate system of governance, since this can be a costly 
task. In the absence of binding institutional structures, oppositional organizations have 
more motives and better chances of challenging the separatist government.  
H3: The more external support, the lower the likelihood of fragmentation. 
But before any of these factors related to the establishment of an effective governance 
system are relevant, there needs to be a window of opportunity that allows for the 
creation of cohesive separatist institutions. This window of opportunity is present only in 
the case of state weakness. Generally, insurgents tend to face a political environment that 
is dominated by counterinsurgency efforts of the nation-state’s government, and that is 
therefore infertile ground for secessionist institution building. Indeed, any properly 
functioning incumbent state will actively attempt to disrupt the formation of a 
‘counterstate sovereign,’ and so remain “the premier competitor and threat to any non-
state-produced political and social order” (Mampilly, 2011: 37). The stronger the state, 
the more likely it is that counterinsurgency attempts succeed. This relates to the 
argument of Kalyvas (2008), who claims that strong states are generally more likely to 
facilitate ethnic defection compared to weaker actors, because stronger states tend to be 
endowed with more resources (e.g. military resources and territorial control) that can 
enable this process. In other words, stronger states are better able to engender 
collaboration with the state – and thus fragmentation of the separatist movement. Their 
resources allow them to spoil the establishment of effective governance systems.  
But while strong states can spoil attempts at separatism by (a) using divide-and-rule 
tactics, (b) violent repression, and (c) the initiation of civil war, weak or failed states do 
not have the means to spoil the state-building process of internal contesters and 
therefore provide more viable conditions for insurgent organizations to create an 
effective governance system. Alternatively, states that are strong in terms of material 
capabilities can nonetheless be weakened by internal political rivalries. If incumbent 
 
18 The Enemy Within 
politicians face challengers to their rule, their priority will shift from eliminating 
counterstate challengers to eliminating internal challengers, as they will attach most 
importance to ensuring their (actual or political) survival. Both distracting and weakening 
the state apparatus, the internal struggle for political dominance thus opens up a window 
of opportunity that is essential to the success of separatist governance systems. As such, 
political fragmentation of the incumbent state facilitates the establishment of cohesion in 
separatist institutions. In short, the strength of the institutions of the incumbent state is 
expected to affect the cohesion of separatist institutions through its impact on the 
success of the secessionist government in establishing effective governance systems.  
H4: The weaker the state, the lower the likelihood of fragmentation.  
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4 Research design 
4.1 Methodology 
Although the quantitative method of large-n statistical analysis is useful to discover links 
between independent and dependent variables, it can “say little about the links between 
cause and effect” (Mampilly, 2011: 18). I will therefore focus instead on qualitative 
methods, and use process tracing to look into the emergence of divisions in different 
separatist movements and to examine how these divisions create positive pluralism in 
some cases but become toxic in others. More specifically, I want to use process oriented 
analysis to identify the causal mechanisms that link the significant independent variables 
(i.e. effective governance, institutionalization of representation, and state strength) to the 
dependent variable (i.e. movement fragmentation). In order to find evidence of these 
links, the dependent and independent variables are operationalized as follows: 
Dependent variable:  
Fragmentation. Entails at the most basic level that a secessionist movement encompasses 
a number of competing factions that all claim to represent the interests of the group in 
its quest for independence (Cunningham et al., 2012). As argued by Bakke et al. (2012), 
however, the distribution of power among these factions is also important: only those 
organizations with sufficient power to challenge both the other factions and the state are 
relevant. I therefore consider fragmentation to mean the existence of multiple factions of 
comparable power. The more factions of comparable power a movement contains, the 
more fragmented the movement is considered to be. If there is only one relevant faction, 
the movement is cohesive.  
Independent variables:  
Service provision. Mampilly argues that in order for the provision of services to be 
effective, the insurgent organization has to demonstrate the following three capacities: 
“First, it must be able to develop a force capable of policing the population, providing a 
degree of stability that makes the production of other governance functions possible. 
Second, the organization should develop a dispute resolution mechanism, either through 
a formal judicial structure or through an ad hoc system. […] Third, the organization 
should develop a capacity to provide other public goods beyond security” (Mampilly, 
2011: 17). I will use this definition to determine whether an organization representing a 
separatist movement provides services effectively. If a separatist organization 
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demonstates all three of the aforementioned capacities it is effective in providing 
services; if it is able to provide security but no other public goods it is considered to be 
partially effective; and if none of the above capacities are demonstrated, then there is 
noneffective provision of services. 
Institutionalization of representation. With regard to the gathering or maintaining of 
popular support and legitimacy, the institutionalization of representation entails the 
development of feedback mechanisms that foster civilian participation in governmental 
issues. In order to also ensure organizational support, the movement has to adopt an 
institutionalized system of legitimate representation through which a variety of 
preferences can be accommodated. Thus, when an organization representing a separatist 
movement has developed feedback mechanisms as well as legitimate representation, the 
conditions for the institutionalization of representation are met. If it developed only one 
of the two, it has partially institutionalized representation; and if it developed neither one, 
it has not institutionalized representation. 
External support. External actors such as international organizations, NGOs, diaspora 
groups, and states can provide material as well as nonmaterial support to separatist 
movements, including financial and military resources, training, and legitimacy. Anecdotal 
evidence of the external contribution of these different kinds of resources will serve as a 
measure for external support. The more resources a separatist organization receives from 
external actors, the higher it scores on external support.  
State strength. Understood as the ability of a government to exercise control over its 
territory. Although there  are many different measures that can be thought of as 
indicating different aspects of state strength, only those relating to the state’s ability to 
spoil the state-building attempts of a separatist movement are relevant here. First and 
foremost, this depends on the degree of cohesion in the state leadership, as it affects the 
ability to take swift decisions about the actions taken concerning the separatist 
movement and the prioritization of eliminating counterstate challengers. The next 
relevant indicator is military strength, as military capabilities will relate to the ability of 
the government to crack down on nonstate challengers through violent repression or the 
initiation of civil war. Another indicator is the financial assets available to a government, 
as it relates to its ability to provide material incentives to certain elements within the 
separatist movement as part of divide-and-rule tactics. A last factor is the presence of a 
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functioning infrastructural system, as it ensures the accessibility of separatist regions and 
therefore the government’s ability to exercise territorial control.  
4.2 Case selection 
This study will consist of three case studies that vary on the dependent variable (i.e., that 
project different degrees of fragmentation), and that allow for the adoption of different 
analytical strategies. First of all, the case of the Chechens in Russia allows for longitudinal 
analysis of variation, as the Chechen separatist movement became increasingly 
fragmented over time. Second, the case of the Armenians in Azerbaijan will be studied as 
a straightforward example of a separatist movement in which hardly any fragmentation 
occurred. Thirdly, newly independent Georgia provides examples of both cohesion and 
fragmentation, as the incumbent state fragmented while the Abkhaz maintained unity – 
creating an interesting opportunity for comparative analysis. As the different actors in 
these three cases also vary in their effectiveness in service provision, the 
institutionalization of representation, the amount of external support, and the strength of 
the state institutions they face, they will allow for testing all four aforementioned 
hypotheses. In addition, all cases emerged in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and thus face a similar institutional and temporal context; and as they are all 
located in the Caucasus, they also have similar geographical conditions. By keeping these 
contextual variables constant, I can control for some of the alternative intervening 
variables and more clearly identify the causal relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables under investigation.  
4.3 Data collection 
As the above listed indicators show, all variables are examined through qualitative data. 
The collection of these data took place in several steps. First, I looked at Minorities At 
Risk (MAR) group profiles, 2  Uppsala Conflict Database conflict profiles, 3  and 
International Crisis Group reports4 for more general overviews of the separatist conflicts 
studied and the actors involved in them. I then searched more specifically for journal 
articles and books providing a historical overview of the movement and the 
organizations that are part of it. Subsequently, I accessed the websites of the relevant 
organizations to get an impression of their degree of fragmentation, service provision, 
institutionalization of representation, and external support. Newspaper articles will be 
                                                 
2 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp#qualitativemar 
3 http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php 
4 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe.aspx 
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used as an additional, primary source that can give a more fine-grained picture of these 
variables.  
4.4 Advantages and limitations of the research design 
Heuristic case studies are a good method for the task of theory development, as they 
serve to “inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal 
paths” (George and Bennett, 2004: 75). According to George and Bennett, the best 
method of using case studies for theory development is analyzing and comparing 
multiple cases: “The strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use 
of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study 
or research program” (George and Bennett, 2005: 18). Following this comparative case 
study design, this research project has the potential to contribute in important ways to 
our understanding of processes of cohesion and fragmentation and the role of 
institutions in explaining these. Nonetheless, it can only provide tentative insights and no 
firm conclusions. Since only three cases are studied that are all positioned in the post-
Soviet context, any conclusions drawn may only be applicable to a limited part of the 
world and a short period of time: the institutional legacy of Soviet ethnofederalism highly 
affected its successor countries, and resulted in a unique pattern of state weakness that is 
not readily found elsewhere. Due to constraints in time and resources, I further did not 
have the opportunity to do fieldwork or conduct interviews on any of the cases, and thus 
had to work with sources that are not specifically fit for the question I am trying to 
answer. This made the identification of causal linkages much more difficult. Another 
important limitation was that I can only read English-language literature, and therefore 
could not access any native-language sources – and the English-language literature might 
provide an incomplete or even biased picture of the cases studied. These problems would 
have to be addressed in future research.  
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5 Analysis and discussion 
As mentioned in the previous section, comparing and analyzing multiple cases is the best 
way of drawing inferences from case studies. The cases chosen for this purpose are 
Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, and Abkhazia in its struggle with Georgia. All of these 
regions are part of former-Soviet states, and declared independence after the break-up of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 (Zürcher, 2007). But while the governments of Nagorno 
Karabakh and Abkhazia managed to unite their population and create an effective 
governance system, the Chechen separatist movement fell prey to infighting, splintering 
authority among the different factions into ‘thousands of little pieces’ (Akhmadov and 
Lanskoy, 2010: 94). The Georgian government, in turn, was highly fragmented due to an 
internal struggle for political dominance. As a result, Georgia has not been able to fully 
regain control over its separatist regions to this day, with Abkhazia still existing as a de 
facto independent state – just like Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan. The Chechen 
separatists, on the other hand, remain to be discarded as ‘a bunch of terrorists’ (Agence 
France Presse, 2002). As summarized in table 1, these diverging patterns of 
fragmentation and cohesion can largely be explained on the basis of my hypotheses.  
Table 1: Predictions and reality in the different cases. An asterisk (*) indicates a correct prediction. 
Case  
H1: Service 
Provision 
H2: Repre-
sentation 
H3: State  
Strength 
H4: External  
Support 
Outcome 
Chechnya 
  1991-1994 
  1994-1996 
  1996-1999 
  1999-2002 
 
 
Partial 
Partial 
No* 
No* 
 
Partial 
Yes* 
Partial 
No* 
 
Weak* 
Weak* 
Average 
Strong* 
 
None 
None 
None* 
None* 
 
Cohesion 
Cohesion 
Fragmentation 
Fragmentation 
Nagorno 
Karabakh 
 
 
 
Yes* Yes* Weak* Much* Cohesion 
Abkhazia 
 
Georgia 
 
Yes* 
 
No* 
Yes* 
 
Partial 
Weak* 
 
Weak 
Much* 
 
None* 
Cohesion 
 
Fragmentation 
 
In the next section, I will provide a brief overview of the institutional context of the 
Soviet Union. All separatist movements discussed in this thesis inherited similar 
institutions from the Soviet system, but made very different use of them – resulting in 
greatly diverging patterns of cohesion and fragmentation.  
 
24 The Enemy Within 
5.1 The institutional legacy of the Soviet Union 
From 1922 to 1924, the Soviet Union introduced ethnofederalism as the foundation to 
its institutional structure. A new political map was introduced that was based on the 
territorialization of ethnicity, in which different levels of administrative units were strictly 
embedded in the hierarchy of a highly centralized bureaucratic structure. The union 
republics were at the top of this hierarchy; the second position was taken by the 
autonomous republics; below them came the autonomous oblasts; and the autonomous 
okrugs occupied the lowest tier. All had different degrees of autonomy. The union 
republics were described in the constitution as sovereign states, with their own borders, 
governments, constitutions, legislatures, judiciaries, and militaries – they even had the 
formal right to secede. The autonomous republics and oblasts also had attributes and 
institutions of sovereignty, but far fewer than the union republics to which they remained 
subject. They did not have a right to secession, either from the Soviet Union or their 
union republic. Autonomous okrugs had no privileges apart from the right to cultural 
autonomy (Zürcher, 2007).  
Importantly, the new borders of the different administrative units were drawn specifically 
to prevent the crystallization of nationalism and control the most threatening nation-state 
projects within the Soviet territory. Submerging some groups while dividing others, the 
Soviet leadership “fostered isolation and even nourished old jealousies and rivalries, thus 
facilitating its control over the peoples of the area” (Rorlich in Roeder, 2007: 63). This 
divide-and-rule tactic too defined the Caucasus region. While the Armenians, Azerbaijani, 
and Georgians received their own union republic, its territories did not match their titular 
groups. Not only did every ethnoterritorial unit encompass a range of ethnic groups, 
multiple ethnic groups were also spread out over different units, with, for example, a 
substantial part of the Armenian population residing in Azerbaijan and the Ossets being 
split between Russia and Georgia (Zürcher, 2007). It were exactly these divisions that 
developed into secessionist tensions when all union republics by default became 
independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As such, the Soviet 
Union is a prime example of how both institutional design and state strength are 
instrumental to the maintenance of cohesion within society. 
The fall of the Soviet Union was associated with a period of instability and regime change. 
“All states in the [Caucasus] region experienced political instability at the center, 
embarked on a rapid change from autocracy to democracy, and turned into weak 
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transitional regimes en route” (Zürcher, 2007: 49). Struggles over political dominance 
between the Soviet leadership and its union republics inhibited decision making, leading 
to a general condition of state weakness that functioned as a window of opportunity for 
the realization of secessionist aspirations. In particular, “Local elites in Abkhazia, Ossetia, 
Karabakh, and Chechnya wanted to seize the political opportunity that the weakening of 
the central state offered and opted for secession” (ibid: 50). Those ethnic groups that had 
been disadvantaged by Soviet ethnofederalism – but that were vested with at least some 
political institutions – now declared independence. Although they had all inherited a 
similar institutional structure from the Soviet Union, the movements all made very 
different use of their institutional legacy. While one would expect that those movements 
that had a higher institutional status in the Soviet system would have stronger institutions, 
the following case studies show different. Indeed, now independent Georgia used to be a 
union republic under the Soviet system and thus had the highest institutional status, yet 
turned out to be more fragmented than the separatist regions in its territory. 
Autonomous oblast Nagorno Karabakh in turn made very effective use of the existing 
institutional system, while the higher ranked autonomous republic Chechnya completely 
abolished all Soviet institutions. As a result, Chechnya without doubt was the least 
successful in providing effective governance and creating a cohesive separatist movement.  
 
5.2 Chechnya: smashing the window of opportunity 
5.2.1 Historical background 
As a result of the divide-and-rule tactics of Soviet ethnofederalism, Chechnya shared an 
autonomous republic with the much smaller Ingushetia since 1936 (Hughes, 2001). But 
after allegations of collaboration with Germany in the Second World War, the Checheno-
Ingushetia Autonomous Republic was dissolved and its population deported to central 
Asia in 1944 (Brauer, 2002). When the Autonomous Republic was restored and its 
population allowed to return thirteen years later, the Chechen people had suffered 
incredible losses: estimates of the number of deaths vary from roughly a third to almost 
half of the Chechen population (Vatchagaev, 2007). Until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, Chechnya continued to be one of the most disadvantaged and 
underdeveloped regions of the union republic of Russia. These destructive policies 
resulted not only in widespread distrust of the state, but also in a strong national identity.  
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Nonetheless, the Chechen separatist movement was never very cohesive (see Figure 1). 
Already when the Chechen National Congress was founded in 1990, there were strong 
rivalries between distinct local factions. Three of the most notable factions were 
represented at the Congress, namely a communist faction guided by Doku Zavgayev, a 
‘centrist’ faction headed by Salambek Khadziev, and an Islamic faction that included 
Zemlikhan Yandarbiyev, Beslan Gantemirov, and Yaragi Mamodayev. All of them were 
advocating full sovereignty for Chechnya-Ingushetia 5  (Dunlop, 1998), but they had 
different principles they wanted to be at the foundation of this ‘sovereign state in the 
making’. Dzhokhar Dudayev, a Soviet Air Force general, was chosen as the leader of the 
Congress specifically because he was an outsider and therefore not caught up in any of 
these rivalries (Zürcher, 2007). Still, he was unable to bring the different factions together. 
Under his leadership the Congress rather turned into an anti-communist coalition that 
quickly alienated those factions that envisioned a different future for Chechnya. In 
addition, he delegitimized and dismantled the existing institutions of the Supreme Soviet 
that until then had served as the foundations for effective governance. Dudayev turned 
out to be unable to fill this institutional vacuum, and service provision was virtually 
absent from the outset. With these policies, that characterized the crucial first years of 
Chechnya’s self-declared independence, Dudayev smashed the only window of 
opportunity the Chechens would be offered to create a cohesive institutional apparatus. 
As a result, the initial years of the Dudayev regime “will go down in Chechen history as a 
time of lost opportunities: in these three years, [Dudayev] did not manage to secure a 
basis for economic reforms or for a functioning statehood. Instead, he got caught up in a 
struggle for power between rival elites” (Zürcher, 2007: 80).  
By early 1994, the lack of effective governance had generated widespread dissent among 
Chechen factions as well as the Chechen population. The Russian government further 
spurred this opposition by offering private benefits to oppositional leaders, of which 
greedy warlords made good use. The Russian military made an important miscalculation, 
however, that prevented this opposition from materializing. Expecting that the large-
scale opposition against president Dudayev would translate into an opposition 
supporting Russia (Sultan, 2003), the Russian military invaded Chechnya in December 
1994. Instead, Chechen society united in the face of external threat. The decision-making 
mechanisms embedded in age-old Chechen tradition “ensured that the opposition buried 
                                                 
 5 The regions Chechnya and Ingushetia at this point existed as a single autonomous republic, but would 
become separate republics in September 1991. 
  
 
27 Analysis and discussion 
its disagreements with [Dudayev] and accepted him as wartime leader, though stating 
clearly that once peace had returned, their erstwhile disagreements would re-emerge” 
(ibid: 442-3). And so it happened. The Chechen movement became more cohesive as 
both the Chechen population and factions supported Dudayev, accepting him for once 
as their legitimate representative – but it was never more than a shallow reunification, 
both tactical and temporary. Despite rallying around the President over the course of the 
First Chechen War, the different opposition groups returned to being Dudayev’s biggest 
enemies as soon as the war had been decided. Even his replacement could not return the 
different factions to the presidential ranks. 
  
  
Figure 1: Fragmentation of the Chechen separatist movement over time.  
The more outward the scores on the independent variables, the less favorable they are in terms of cohesion 
(i.e., an outward mark on service provision, representation, or external support indicates their complete 
absence, whereas it means a high score on state strength). 
 
After Dudayev was slain by a Russian guided missile in April 1996, presidential elections 
took place in January 1997 that were won by former commander-in-Chief Aslan 
Maskhadov. The new President found the fragmentation of the Chechen secessionist 
movement too far advanced to be reversed, as he was “insufficiently corrupt and 
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ruthless” to pursue the kind of authoritarian regime that would have been required to 
keep the different factions in check (Derluguian, 2005: 258). Many key figures in the 
movement privately benefited from the anarchic state of Chechnya, and did everything 
they could to maintain it – with fatal results. In the words of Christoph Zürcher,  
“The establishment of statehood in Chechnya went awry because the successful field 
commanders were more interested in perpetuation of the market of violence than in 
restoration of the state. In the permanent struggle for power between the “rump state” and 
the violent entrepreneurs, the remaining state institutions were dismantled, institutions 
capable of containing conflicts were devalued, and the rump state was deprived of the 
resources required to crack down on the private organization of violence. As a consequence, 
Chechnya sank into anomie and internal conflict, which, among other factors, provoked the 
second Russian invasion in 1999.” (Zürcher, 2007: 61) 
In response to a military offensive in the neighboring republic of Dagestan by several 
Chechen commanders, the Russian army invaded Chechnya with no less than 100,000 
men in October 1999 (Zürcher, 2007). The already severely fragmented Chechen 
movement was not capable again of reuniting in the face of this overwhelming show of 
force. As explained by his Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov, the ideas of Maskhadov and 
his commanders were simply too different, and these contradicting opinions were openly 
expressed. This did not just ruin the Chechen movement’s chances of being considered 
“anything other than radicals and terrorists” (Akhmadov and Lanskoy, 2010: 184), but 
also created insurmountable tensions internally. The Chechen movement had reached the 
point of no return, only sliding further down into anarchy and conflict.  
5.2.2 Institutionalization of representation 
The institutionalization of representation is the first variable that clearly affected the 
pattern of cohesion and fragmentation in the Chechen self-determination movement, as 
it had serious shortcomings already in the movement’s earliest days. When the Soviet 
Union started to disintegrate in 1990, it came as no surprise that number of leading 
representatives of the Chechen intelligentsia organized the Chechen National Congress 
and became one of the many Russian regions that issued a declaration of sovereignty 
(Dunlop, 1998). A revolution soon broke out that radically changed the Chechen 
institutional landscape. “The Chechen revolution dismantled all Soviet political 
institutions more quickly and more thoroughly than did all other national independence 
movements of the Soviet Union, in part because the institutions of Soviet power had 
only superficially penetrated Chechen society” (ibid: 78). In addition, the discrimination 
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suffered by the Chechens was much more severe than most other Soviet nationalities, as 
a result of which they wished for a more clean break with Soviet history. The Chechen 
National Congress thus overthrew the Moscow-backed leadership of the Supreme Soviet 
and replaced it with the National Congress of the Chechen People, to be headed by 
general Dzhokhar Dudayev. This move was backed by many national-radical 
movements6 (Dunlop, 1998), and Dudayev received broad support from the Chechen 
population. Indeed, he was “a charismatic and determined leader with high popularity 
among Chechens”, and was elected President in 1991 with 90 percent of the vote 
(Zürcher, 2007: 79). Initially, Dudayev thus did represent the general public. 
The institutionalization of representation was only partial, however, as there was no 
room for the views of different factions within the radicalizing National Congress of the 
Chechen People. The abolition of the Supreme Soviet was worrisome to part of the 
organizers of the first Congress, a large group of intellectuals and moderates whom did 
not agree with breaking all ties with Russia (Akhmadov and Lanskoy, 2010; Gall and de 
Waal, 1997). As the Congress leadership did not allow for the representation of these 
factions within the institution, the first divisions in Chechen politics soon started to 
emerge. Already in 1991, Lecha Umkhayev founded one of the first parties in opposition 
to the National Congress: Daymokhk (‘Fatherland’). It was soon joined by another party 
named Marsho (‘Freedom’), led by Umar Avturkhanov, and these two united with four 
other, smaller parties to form the Round Table in 1992 (Akhmadov and Lanskoy, 2010). 
The fact that this group of organizations did not strive for independence made that they 
had little popular support, however. Due to their policy of arguing for a form of 
autonomy while remaining part of the Russian Federation, most Chechens regarded them 
to be “Russian puppets, close to the former Communist power structure, who bring 
shame to Chechnya” (Erlanger, 1995). The power of these organizations was therefore 
not comparable to that of the Chechen government, and a unipolar balance of power 
was sustained within the Chechen separatist movement.  
The popular disapproval of organizations with links to Russia became even stronger after 
the Russian invasion of Chechnya at the end of 1994. The start of the First Chechen War 
turned Russia into a common enemy, which ensured that, for over the course of the war 
at least, President Dudayev was accepted as the legitimate representative of both the 
                                                 
6 The Vainakh Democratic Party, the Islamic Path, the Green Movement, the Confederation of Peoples of 
the Caucasus, the Chechen-Ingush Popular Front, the Movement for Democratic Reform, and others 
(Dunlop, 1998; Henze, 1995; Ruff, 2009). 
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Chechen population and the various opposition groups. He did not manage to 
consolidate this occasional institutionalization of representation, however. Dudayev 
continued to make little effort to create an effective system of governance, and as he 
refrained from filling the institutional vacuum left by the abolition of the Supreme Soviet, 
he also failed to consolidate the new Chechen state. The National Congress of the 
Chechen people consisted of no more than some ad hoc political bodies that had little 
procedural legitimacy, and it became impossible to strengthen these organs even when 
Dudayev was replaced. The 1997 presidential elections were deemed free and fair by 
international observers, and having received almost 60 percent of the votes, former 
commander-in-chief Aslan Maskhadov was installed as the new President of Chechnya 
(Akhmadov and Lanskoy, 2010). With the support of the general public, Maskhadov 
earnestly attempted to revive the system of service provision and reestablish professional 
military discipline and civil legal order (Derluguian, 2005). But lacking both the necessary 
resources, international recognition, and factional support, Maskhadov could offer 
neither jobs nor security to its civilians. This inability was due in large part to the fact that 
Dudayev had neglected the system of service provision since the beginning of his rule. 
5.2.3 Service provision 
Instead of investing in general service provision, Dudayev bought support by granting 
various smuggling monopolies to its strongmen and allied warlords (Derluguian, 2005). 
While this ensured the security of the population and the survival of the Dudayev regime 
in the short run, in the long run it led to the downfall of the Chechen separatist 
movement. Dudayev had namely deprived the Chechen Government of the economic 
resources needed to maintain the system of social service provision. By the beginning of 
1994, this lack of investment in social services had already created considerable popular 
dissatisfaction. Indeed, a Chechen imam estimated that only one-third of the Chechen 
population continued to support the president while two-thirds were against him. “He 
listed a long catalogue of grievances about what Dudayev had done or failed to do. ‘He 
has done nothing for the republic,’ he said. ‘He hasn’t built a single school or hospital’” 
(Gall and de Waal, 1997: 104). Large part of Chechnya thus came to oppose Dudayev 
because he failed to tackle the country’s economic and social problems and create a 
viable state (German, 2003). Not only did this erode his power base, it also created the 
demand necessary for oppositional organizations to challenge the separatist 
government’s rule. 
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Although the war delayed the consolidation of popular opposition to the separatist 
government at first, it ultimately generated many more grievances because the war 
shattered all that was left of the Soviet system of service provision. The Chechens elected 
Aslan Maskhadov as Dudayev’s successor in the hope that he could restore peace and 
order in Chechnya, and Maskhadov indeed was genuinely dedicated to the task of service 
provision (Derluguian, 2005). Nonetheless, he was unable to offer the jobs and security 
the population so desperately needed – for which he in turn blamed Moscow. Indeed, 
the Russian state contributed to the impossibility of establishing an effective system of 
governance through various spoiling tactics. It started these spoils in the winter of 1994, 
after fighting an internal leadership struggle. 
5.2.4 State strength 
The Chechen declaration of independence in 1991 initially received little attention of the 
leadership in Moscow, as “a power struggle raged between Yeltsin and the Duma, which 
held the political attention and the resources of the new political elite” (Zürcher, 2007: 
80). Between December 1991 and the autumn of 1994, this leadership struggle continued 
to dominate Russian politics. For Chechnya, this meant that its separatist movement was 
left alone and had free reign to secede and reshape the region’s institutions. As long as 
the Russian leadership was too preoccupied with its own power struggle to pay attention 
to Chechnya, relative unity was maintained within the Chechen separatist movement. 
Once Russia started to regain its power, however, it increasingly fed into the process of 
fragmentation through different spoiling tactics. First of all, Russia offered material and 
financial support to different oppositional organizations within Chechnya’s separatist 
movement at a time that the power of the regime had started to decline (Dunlop, 1998; 
Gall and de Waal, 1997). This meant that being an opposition leader became much more 
profitable than supporting the Chechen government, while creating private incentives 
that kept the different warlords from creating a united opposition front (German, 2003). 
Apart from the fact that they were motivated by personal ambition and rivalry, the 
different opposition leaders namely had “virtually nothing in common except a desire to 
get rid of the existing regime” (Gall and de Waal, 1997: 139). This was reflected in the 
multiple alliances and institutional arrangements the different parties engaged in, created 
along practical rather than ideological lines (German, 2003). None of them was upheld 
for a long period of time, as parties easily jumped the bandwagon to collaborate with 
more beneficial partners. This illustrates not only the interplay between collective and 
private motives as discussed by Kalyvas (2003) and Bakke et al. (2012), but also that the 
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Russian state functioned as a spoiler in the Chechen separatist struggle once it started to 
regain its strength. By supporting some opposition groups but not others and repeatedly 
changing between beneficiaries, the Russian government created a private motive for 
infighting that served to further undermine Chechen unity. 
Another way in which Russia drifted apart different factions was through civil war – even 
though this initially seemed a source of unification rather than fragmentation. In the face 
of Russian invasion in 1994, “Even those Chechens who had never supported Dudayev 
now rallied around the President, seeking to defend their homes and families against the 
perceived ‘imperial threat’” (German, 2003: 135). Aslan Maskhadov, at the time the 
Chechen Army’s commander-in-chief, managed to coordinate the activities of the 
different armed groups, turning them into a proper army that even managed to defeat 
Russia in the first Chechen War (Gall and de Waal, 1997). Unfortunately, however, this 
turned out to be yet another ad hoc institutional body unable to withstand the test of 
time. The military structure Maskhadov set up, in which almost every village had its 
appointed commander (ibid), eventually came to be the origin of even more profound 
fragmentation of the Chechen separatist movement. While the loyalty of the different 
commanders, at least initially, did lie with Dudayev and his commander-in-chief, they 
became increasingly autonomous; as such, many of them during or after the first war 
started to function independently from the Army, and would later turn against the 
Chechen government as they were “unwilling to relinquish their powers and 
independence” (Gammer, 2006: 212). The most notable among them were Shamil 
Basayev, Khamzat (Ruslan) Gelayev, and Salman Raduyev; other members were 
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Vakha Arsanov, Aslanbek Ismailov, Abu Movsaev, 
Khunkharpasha Israpilov, and Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiev (Akhmadov and Lanskoy, 
2010; German, 2003; Minorities At Risk Project, 2010). What this shows is how the 
waging of war can also be an effective spoiling tactic: its legacy, the presence of a large 
number of armed fighters that functioned under a decentralized command structure, left 
behind a splintered movement made up of countless small groups trying to maintain 
their influence. Fractionalization on the Chechen side coincided with the reestablishment 
of cohesion within the Russian government, which ultimately decided the second 
Chechen War in Russia’s favor and left Chechnya in scrambles. For the Chechen 
separatist movement, the reconsolidation of cohesion within the Russian leadership in 
the absence of effective separatist institutions thus proved to be fatal. 
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5.2.5 External support 
Another factor that contributed to Chechnya’s troubled history was the fact that it 
received hardly any external support. As Russia prevented the international recognition 
of Chechnya as an independent state, the Chechen government remained isolated. “Thus 
no foreign aid, loans, or investment could be obtained to finance Dudayev’s regime. For 
the same reason neither totalitarianism nor democracy could emerge, since both, in their 
own ways, are difficult things to build and maintain in the absence of functioning 
bureaucratic institutions” (Derluguian, 2005: 254). In other words, the absence of a 
system of effective governance was also partly attributable to the lack of external support.  
The one occasion that the Chechens did receive outside help was after Dudayev had 
been eliminated by the Russians in April 1996. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had already established a presence in Grozny a year 
earlier, and monitored the peace talks between Russia and Chechnya.  When presidential 
and parliamentary elections were scheduled for January 1997, this provided a new 
opportunity to strengthen Chechnya’s institutions that the OSCE was eager to support. 
“The OSCE afforded organizational and financial help and dispatched election observers 
[…] the international community represented by the OSCE had just made it clear that it 
supported Chechnya’s consolidation” (Zürcher, 2007: 86-7). Unfortunately, however, this 
support was insufficient to reestablish the institutional structure that was needed to 
reunite an already profoundly fragmented movement. 
5.2.6 Additional factors  
Without undermining the importance of the variables derived from my hypotheses, the 
Chechen case demonstrates the importance of  one other factor that we will not see in 
any of the other cases: culture. While Chechnya’s age-old traditions ensured that all 
Chechens rallied around the president in the face of external threat, they also inhibited 
true reconciliation and reunification. Blood feud namely is a very important aspect of 
Chechen culture (Gall and de Waal, 1997), and created an obligation for revenge that was 
not easily forgotten. Indeed, “for a Chechen, to be a man is to remember the names of 
seven generations of paternal ancestors… and not only their names, but the 
circumstances of their deaths and the places of their tombstones” (Arutiunov in Dunlop, 
1998 : 211). This meant that the deaths resulting from infighting between the multiple 
Chechen factions developed into a repetitive cycle, and as such became not only a self-
reinforcing process of fragmentation, but also a road to self-destruction.  
 
34 The Enemy Within 
5.3 Nagorno Karabakh: a success story 
5.3.1 Historical background 
Ever since the late 1910s, the enclave Nagorno Karabakh has been fought over by 
Armenia and Azerbaijan (Panossian, 2001). While the overwhelming majority – i.e. 95 
percent – of the population of Karabakh in the early 1920s was Armenian (ibid), the 
Soviet leadership in July 1923 decided to assign the region to Azerbaijan – another 
example of Stalin’s “tendency to divide the Caucasian peoples to prevent unified 
resistance” (Cornell, 2001: 60). The Armenians remained continuously dissatisfied with 
this arrangement, not least because of a long history of repression and intercommunal 
violence that had cumulated into a collective trauma of existential threat. Indeed, the 
national identity of the Armenian people has largely evolved around memories of 
genocide. In 1915, the Ottoman Armenians suffered terrible losses in systematic 
massacres carried out by the Turks, while many Russian Armenians fell victim to 
“murderous clashes with their Muslim neighbors who were later known as Azeris” 
during the revolutions of 1905 and 1917-1920 (Derluguian, 2005: 187).  
Importantly, the collective trauma of the Armenians has always been instrumental to the 
maintenance of unity within the ethnic group. Already in the 1920s, the Karabakh 
Armenians formed an underground organization aiming at the unification of their region 
with Soviet Armenia. The organization’s position on the Karabakh issue was unanimous 
with the Soviet Armenian officials, and the two collaborated closely on expressing their 
dissatisfaction in Moscow (Cheterian, 2008). Collective demands for the transfer of 
Karabakh to the Armenian Republic were made in 1929, 1935, 1963, 1966, 1977, and 
1987 (Panossian, 2001), but repeatedly turned down by the Soviet leadership. From early 
1988, mass demonstrations ensued in Stepanakert, the capital of Karabakh, as well as in 
the Armenian capital Yerevan. Many violent clashes took place, but eventually, it was a 
pogrom against Armenians in the Azeri town Sumgait in the last three days of February 
that triggered the escalation of tensions and led to the start of the Nagorno Karabakh 
War. “In fact, mutual hatred escalated to such a degree that any spark would have been 
capable of initiating the conflict; and the spark which was to make the escalation of the 
ethnic conflict irreversible, was indeed the Sumgait pogrom. After Sumgait, there seemed 
to be no way to diminish the conflict, and in any case this was made impossible by the 
hesitant approach of the Soviet authorities” (Cornell, 2001: 70).  
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Convinced that the relations between the Armenians and the Azeri were irreparably 
damaged and increasingly frustrated with the lack of action from the Soviet institutions, 
the formation of opposition groups in Armenia and Karabakh accelerated. In Armenia 
this led to the merger of different political forces into the Hayots Hamazgayin Sharjum, or 
Armenian National Movement, that was soon to assume power in the Republic (Cornell, 
2001). Within Nagorno Karabakh, political organizations challenging the Soviet 
institutions were initially thwarted by the Soviet authorities. The first organization that 
was founded in the spring of 1988, named Krunk7, was banned within a month; its 
alternative, a Council of Factory Directors, was dissolved equally quickly (Zürcher, 2007). 
In the meantime, the Soviet leadership installed a ‘special government administration’ 
from 12 January 1989 in an attempt to bring the situation back under its control. The 
Administration subsequently suspended all political institutions, including the Karabakh 
Soviet.  
Realizing that they had nothing to win from dealing with Moscow, the Karabakh 
Armenians decided to take matters into their own hands and started to create their own 
political structures. A Congress of Authorized Representatives of the Population of the 
Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was elected in the summer of 1989, with logistic 
support from the Armenian National Movement. The Congress subsequently elected a 
National Council on 24 August 1989, and its Presidium became the de facto government 
of Karabakh (Zürcher, 2007). Benefitting from the weakness of both the Soviet and the 
Azerbaijani state and from extensive Armenian support, this separatist government 
managed to consolidate its leadership and establish a system of effective governance. As 
a result it has never faced any oppositional organizations, and managed to maintain 
cohesion in the Karabakh Armenian self-determination movement.  
5.3.2 Institutionalization of representation 
The first reason for the Karabakh Armenians’ unity is the fact that its government was 
legitimated by a very high degree of acceptance (Zürcher, 2007), which it owed to the 
successful institutionalization of representation. Indeed, the Karabakh representative 
body consulted its citizens from day one, starting with one of its most momentous 
decisions: the declaration of the independence of Nagorno Karabakh. In response to the 
implosion of the Soviet Union, the National Council proclaimed the independence of the 
                                                 
7 “Krunk means ‘stork.’ The stork is a symbol of the Armenians’ longing for their homeland.” (Zürcher, 
2007: 240) 
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region on 2 September 1991, but it did not commence with the establishment of 
permanent institutions until this decision was underlined in a popular referendum. On 10 
December 1991, an overwhelming majority of 99 percent of the population affirmed the 
declaration of independence, thus supporting the establishment of independent 
institutions for Nagorno Karabakh (Panossian, 2001). The political elites chose to create 
a parliamentary republic, to be governed by the Supreme Council of the Republic of 
Nagorno Karabakh. Elections to this Council were held on 28 December, allowing for 
civilian as well as factional representation. The parliament in turn elected a president and 
a prime minister. As the dissolution of the Soviet Union had also triggered the outbreak 
of full scale war, they ruled through a quasi-military body called the State Defense 
Committee until after a ceasefire was signed in May 1994.  
Only after the formal ceasefire and the dissolution of the State Defense Committee in 
December 1994 could the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh truly set about building an 
independent state (Lynch, 2004). The Committee was replaced with a civilian 
government, and Karabakh transformed from a parliamentary to a presidential republic. 
Elections for both the parliament and the position of ‘President of the Republic’ are still 
held regularly and generate a high turnout, illustrating the determination of the 
population of Nagorno Karabakh to establish democratic rule and “giving its rulers a 
strong semblance of democratic legitimacy” (Panossian, 2001: 149). Although factional 
divisions have emerged since the return of peace, differences are expressed only within 
the existing institutional structures of the separatist government (ibid). Indeed, the 
emergence of alternative organizations has been prevented thanks to the successful 
institutionalization of representation. In Karabakh, a democratic state-building process is 
well under way. 
5.3.3 Service provision 
Although severely hampered by an economic blockade from Azerbaijan, the separatist 
government of Nagorno Karabakh has also been relatively successful at the provision of 
services – a success that it owes largely to the support of Armenia. As usual, the first 
service the government wanted to ensure was security. Although there was no state-
organized army in Karabakh before 1992, the government nonetheless had a large pool 
of fighters at its disposal, due to the all-encompassing mobilization of Karabakh society 
as well as the influx of volunteers from Armenia. Initially, these fighters were organized 
as paramilitary groups and self-defense units with loose coordination, but a National 
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Defense Council was installed by the end of 1992 in order to coordinate military efforts 
(Zürcher, 2007). This successfully “put an end to the volunteer brigade system inherited 
from the guerilla phase of the conflict, and created a centralized control and command” 
(Cheterian, 2008: 138).  
The Karabakh Armenians benefited from this improvement in coordination particularly 
because the Azerbaijani army failed to do the same. As power struggles within the 
fractured political elite undermined its military efforts, Azerbaijan got stuck in a vicious 
circle of dysfunction: “Cleavages between incumbent and oppositional elites hindered an 
efficient execution of the war and led to military defeats; in turn, every big defeat led to a 
change of government” (Zürcher, 2007: 182-3). The Karabakh Armenians benefited 
from each occasion of internal strife with military victory. Eventually, they managed to 
bring under their control not only all of the territory of Nagorno Karabakh, but also the 
surrounding areas that they consequently emptied of their Azeri population (Cornell, 
2001). As such, the Armenians created a buffer zone that the Azeri were unable to 
penetrate, finally forcing the Azerbaijani government to recognize its defeat and sign a 
ceasefire in June 1994.  
Now the government of Karabakh guaranteed the security of its civilians at the most 
basic level, it had to prove that it could also meet the other needs of its civilians. This 
started with the expansion of its security services with police agencies, border troops, and 
customs representatives (Lynch, 2004). Next, it took up the revival of other services in 
the devastated region, and restored the provision of social services and the educational 
system – it is even operating a university (Panossian, 2001). The Karabakh government 
has thus put much effort in establishing an effective governance system, fulfilling all the 
basic government functions. Indeed, “a sense of state presence is palpable: the streets are 
lit at night, most of the buildings in the capital town have been rebuilt […] and there is 
no feeling of lawlessness” (Lynch, 2004: 45). As a result, the population considers the 
government of Karabakh legitimate and has no reason to explore alternative options.  
The absence of international recognition – including by Armenia – remains a serious 
impediment to the recovery of Nagorno Karabakh, however. In the absence of 
international trade or foreign assistance and under an economic blockade from 
Azerbaijan, Karabakh is wholly dependent on Armenia economically. “Every year the 
separatist authorities draw up a budget, of which they can fund only 20 to 25 percent of 
expenditure. Armenia then provides an annual ‘interstate loan’ to Nargorno-Karabakh 
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that covers the remainder of its needs” (Lynch, 2004: 82). In addition, Karabakh relies on 
Armenia for its telecommunications, transport, and the issuance of passports for those 
who need to travel abroad; Yerevan even pays the salaries of certain civil servants 
(Panossian, 2001). The ability of the separatist government to provide services is thus 
reliant on the external support of Armenia, an important factor that will be discussed 
more elaborately later in this chapter. Interestingly, however, it also shows how the 
economic near-isolation of Karabakh also has its advantages for the separatist 
government. The economic blockade can namely be used as a justification for the 
weakness of the economy, explaining away the shortcomings of the separatist 
government as a consequence of the hostile policies of the incumbent state (Lynch, 
2004). Limiting the expectations the population has of the separatist government while 
further antagonizing the government of Azerbaijan, the economic blockade has thus only 
served to strengthen the position of the separatist government. As the next section 
shows, this is only one example of the counterproductive effects Azeri politics has had 
on the separatist movement in Nagorno Karabakh. 
5.3.4 State strength 
The Karabakh separatist movement greatly benefited from the structural weakness of the 
state institutions of both the Soviet Union and Azerbaijan. Relating to the first, the 
conflict over the Karabakh region was the first in the Soviet sphere to escalate, and it 
painfully brought to light the managerial weakness of the decaying Soviet Union. Indeed, 
“Karabakh displayed not only that the Soviet Union had no institutionalized mechanisms 
to deal with ethnonational conflicts but also the extent to which the Soviet center was 
quickly losing its coercive capacities. Hence, neither institutions nor policies were 
available to prevent the region from devolving into war” (Zürcher, 2007: 181). With the 
Soviet leadership unable to contain the conflict, a delicate situation emerged that was 
interpreted as both a serious security threat and a window of opportunity by the 
Karabakh Armenians (ibid). The window of opportunity was, as in the Chechen case, 
created by the ethnofederal legacy of the Soviet Union, which ensured that the power 
vacuum resulting from the weakening of Soviet rule could only be filled by political 
institutions deriving their legitimacy from nationalism (Cheterian, 2008). The security 
threat, on the other hand, was caused by the lack of credible guarantees offered by the 
Azeri state to the protection of its Armenian minority. 
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From the outset, the separatist conflict over Karabakh was largely the result of a 
commitment problem on the side of Azerbaijan. Rather than providing assurances of 
protection, the government of Azerbaijan engaged in identity politics that strongly 
repressed any expression of ethnicity by the Armenian population, while simultaneously 
shifting the demographic balance slowly but deliberately in favor of the Azeri (Cheterian, 
2008; Panossian, 2001). In light of their historic losses, the Armenians interpreted these 
policies as a threat to the very survival of the Armenian people. “For the Armenians, the 
question of [Karabakh] encapsulated all their historical sorrows and became the symbolic 
substitute for the much larger trauma of the 1915 genocide and the loss of historically 
Armenian lands that remained under Turkey’s control” (Derluguian, 2005: 189). Not 
surprisingly, the Armenians in both Karabakh and Armenia therefore continued to 
protest against what they considered an infringement on their nationality, while the Azeri, 
who saw Karabakh as part of their historic homeland, regarded themselves the victim of 
Armenian nationalism (Laitin and Suny, 1999).  
The Karabakh question led to intensified mobilization on both sides, resulting in 
frequent clashes and increasing tensions between the Armenians and the Azeri. But while 
the Karabakh question created cohesion on the part of the Armenians, it had no uniting 
force in Azerbaijan. Instead, an intense power struggle broke out within its divided 
political elite that undermined the government’s ability to control the already weak armed 
forces and left the front line without the necessary support (Cheterian, 2008; Cornell, 
2001). The Karabakh conflict thus became a political playing field “on which ever more 
irreconcilable divergences manifested themselves between the Moscow-oriented 
Communists on the one hand and the national-democratic opposition on the other. This 
domestic political fragmentation hindered the organization of state-run military violence 
and explains, to a large extent, the defeat of Azerbaijan on the battlefield” (Zürcher, 
2007: 156-7). State weakness thus translated into military weakness, creating 
opportunities that the Armenians were quick to exploit. As pointed out by Cheterian 
(2008), the majority of the Armenian military victories coincided with internal strife 
within Azerbaijan, and each of these victories tightened the Armenian grip on the 
territory of Nagorno Karabakh. This territorial control was at the foundation of the 
establishment of a system of effective governance, and as such to the maintenance of a 
cohesive separatist movement. 
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5.3.5 External support 
As already mentioned earlier, the Karabakh Armenians received massive external support 
from the Armenian state during as well as after the war. Armenian volunteers, 
paramilitary troops, and even entire Armenian army units fought in the war between 
1991 and 1994, and the Armenian government additionally provided weapons and 
funding (Cornell, 2001; Lynch, 2004; Zürcher, 2007). This support was key to their 
military victory, and Armenia’s powerful armed forces as well as its strategic alliance with 
Russia remain “key shields protecting the Karabakh state” (Lynch, 2004: 81). In addition, 
the Armenian state still fulfills a central role in the ability of the Karabakh separatist 
government to provide effective governance. It has enabled the institutionalization of 
representation by funding the construction of state institutions as well as sponsoring 
elections (Zürcher, 2007), and it allowed for service provision by securing the majority of 
the separatist government’s budget as well as direct investment in the region’s 
infrastructure (Lynch, 2004; Panossian, 2001). Although there are no formal diplomatic 
relations between the two entities, Nagorno Karabakh is practically an informal region of 
Armenia, unified with its legal, economic, and security space (ibid).  
Armenia further channels into the region large amounts of support from the Armenian 
diaspora, that remains to stand firmly behind the Karabakh cause. As explained by Lynch, 
“Nagorno-Karabakh has pride of place in the minds and hearts of the diaspora and has 
been the focus of intensive assistance. As a separatist area, it has been terra incognita for 
most international organizations. Several large diaspora organizations, such as the Fund 
for Armenian Relief, and in particular the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund, stepped into the 
vacuum to provide humanitarian assistance to the fledging state” (Lynch, 2004: 82). It 
was from these funds that most medical facilities and schools have been rebuilt, which 
means that the diaspora support, too, has played a central role in the provision of 
services by the separatist government in Nagorno Karabakh. Enabling the establishment 
of an effective governance system, external support has thus been key to the legitimacy 
of the Karabakh separatist government, in turn preventing the emergence of challengers 
to its rule and maintaining unity within the movement.  
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5.4 Abkhazia and Georgia: Separatist cohesion, state fragmentation 
5.4.1 Historical background 
At the start of the Soviet era, Abkhazia was not part of Georgia; it had rather been 
proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic on 4 March 1921, and thus a signatory to the 
Soviet Union in its own right. Although it entered into a ‘treaty relationship’ with 
Georgia already in late 1921, the Abkhaz continued to regard their legal position as a 
separate entity as the formal basis for their independence from Georgia. Accordingly, 
Abkhazia considered its incorporation into the Georgian Republic in 1931 as an 
Autonomous Republic an illegal act that it could not get to terms with (Cornell, 2001). 
Compared to the Chechens and the Karabakh Armenians, however, the Abkhaz suffered 
little from the policies of the host state, having been spared the deportations and 
genocide that decimated these other groups. “Georgians have gone so far as to claim that 
Abkhazia’s falling under Georgian and not Russian jurisdiction in fact saved Abkhaz 
culture from annihilation” (Cornell, 2002: 176). Indeed, the Abkhaz were compensated 
for their subjection to Georgian rule with quite a beneficial treatment, receiving 
“disproportionate access to resources and to key political positions” in the representative 
bodies of their region (Zürcher, 2007: 120). Abkhazia further was one of the wealthiest 
regions of the Soviet Union, enjoying a standard of living far higher than the rest of 
Georgia (ibid).  
The Abkhaz nonetheless felt to be victim of a forcible policy of ‘Georgianization’,  and 
their status as a minority in their own region resulted in sustained fears of extermination. 
“As Georgian nationalism flourished in the late 1980s, the Abkhaz population, and 
especially a section of the local elites, became increasingly restive, fearing their possible 
cultural and ethnic disappearance within Georgia” (Lynch, 2004: 27). In response, a 
popular forum named Aydgylara (‘Unity’) was established in November 1988, which 
organized a mass demonstration in the village Lykhny in March 1989. Some 20,000 of its 
participants, including Abkhaz members of the Communist elite, signed the Lykhny 
Declaration that called for the reestablishment of Abkhazia as a Soviet Socialist Republic 
(Zürcher, 2007). In Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, the Georgians responded with one of 
the biggest protests in the capital’s history, in which anti-Abkhaz and anti-Communist 
sentiments came together. Its violent crackdown on the 9th of April instantly destroyed 
whatever legitimacy the Communist regime had left, resulting in the radicalization of the 
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Georgian national movement and absorbing all room for compromise with the state 
authorities (ibid).  
Moscow responded by replacing the leadership of the Georgian Communist Party, but 
this only had counterproductive effects: the new leadership namely decided to adopt the 
main positions of the nationalist opposition and effectuated a declaration of sovereignty 
by the Georgian Supreme Soviet in March 1990. This led to a deterioration of Georgia’s 
relationship with Moscow as well as the Abkhaz, who feared that their autonomous 
position within an independent Georgia would be compromised. “In reaction to these 
unmistakable steps toward Georgian independence from the Soviet Union, the Abkhaz 
took unmistakable steps toward independence from Georgia. Significantly, the 
Abkhazian Supreme Soviet unilaterally proclaimed Abkhazia to be a sovereign union 
republic and petitioned Moscow to be incorporated into the Soviet Union as a union 
republic. These steps were declared invalid by the Georgian Supreme Soviet” (Zürcher, 
2007: 123-4). Although the mutual declarations of independence generated increasing 
tensions between Georgia and Abkhazia, the conflict long remained confined to the 
political realm, and the Georgian and Abkhaz leaderships managed to keep a working 
relationship until March 1992 (Cornell, 2002).  
In March 1992, a change of Georgia’s President that coincided with the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union brought the previously latent conflict into the military realm. Expecting 
to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity quickly, Georgian forces entered Abkhazia in 
August 1992 and managed to take control over the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi within days. 
With help from Russia and volunteers from the North Caucasus, the Abkhaz initiated a 
counteroffensive the next year that eventually expelled all Georgian forces from the 
region (Lynch, 2004). Importantly, however, “The Russian intervention was not the 
major cause of the Georgian defeat—or the Abkhaz victory! It was the incredible 
disorganization on the Georgian side which contrasted with a much more disciplined and 
determined fighting force on the Abkhaz side” (Cheterian, 2008: 3). As in Azerbaijan, 
political fragmentation within the Georgian state had translated into military weakness, 
from which the Abkhaz – with sufficient external support – could benefit. Once they had 
secured territorial control over their region, the Abkhaz, like the Karabakh Armenians, 
“set out to develop all the institutions of statehood, despite nonrecognition and 
international isolation” (Lynch, 2004: 30).  
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Even more so than in the case of 
Nagorno Karabakh, Georgia’s 
struggle with Abkhazia thus shows 
how the political fragmentation of 
the incumbent government is a 
destructive symptom of state 
weakness, creating a window of 
opportunity for a separatist state-
building project around which the 
secessionist movement can cohere.  
 
 
5.4.2 Institutionalization of representation 
The process of cohesion of the Abkhaz has been shaped strongly by the institutional 
structure of the Soviet ethnofederal system – indeed, “The significance of the state 
institutions of the Abkhaz ASSR8 for the purposes of Abkhaz ethnic mobilization can 
hardly be overstated” (Cornell, 2002: 184). More so than either the Chechens or the 
Karabakh Armenians, the Abkhaz made use of the political institutions that their 
autonomous status had granted them, as their self-determination movement emerged in 
congruence with – rather than in opposition to – the regional Soviet institutions. As 
compensation for the rejection of their requests for transferal to Russian rule, the 
Abkhaz received disproportionate representation in the region’s representative bodies. 
Although they only constituted 17 percent of the population, as much as 67 percent of 
the region’s government ministers were Abkhazian – “hence the ease with which the 
Abkhaz could later use the state apparatus of their ASSR for their secessionist aims” 
(Cornell, 2001: 145). Indeed, this position of secure control over the local administration 
and economy enabled the Abkhaz elites to put the state and party bureaucracies at the 
service of the national cause (Zürcher, 2007). 
This control over the institutions of the republic further created career opportunities for 
the Abkhaz political elite that ensured its continuing support and kept it from founding 
oppositional organizations (Cornell, 2002). In addition, Abkhazia’s autonomous 
structures provided it with “an excellent and ready-made power base that included 
decision-making bodies, links to outside support and to financial resources, as well as to 
                                                 
8 ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
Figure 2: Fragmentation and cohesion in Georgia 
and Abkhazia, respectively. 
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media outlets for propagating the message to the people” that served as a solid basis for 
popular support (ibid: 186). Any expressions of discontent that did emerge since have 
been confined to the political realm. After the veterans’ association Amtsakhara criticized 
the lack of leadership from the incumbent president, for example, its collaboration with 
various civil-society organizations, businessmen and disgruntled former government 
ministers resulted in the victory of the oppositional candidate in the 2004 presidential 
elections (Caspersen, 2008).  
In the Georgian self-determination movement, institutional development took an entirely 
different course. The first expressions of opposition to the Supreme Soviet stemmed 
from the early 1970s, when a small but vocal group of dissidents emerged in Tbilisi. The 
most famous among them were Merab Kostava, Valentina Pailodze, and Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia. They regarded Soviet rule in Georgia as illegal and the state institutions 
illegitimate, a received much popular support in their struggle to defend the Georgian 
culture and language (Cheterian, 2008). After Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and 
perestroika had opened new political possibilities in Georgia, the first nationalist 
organizations started to appear. First there was the Ilia Chavchavadze Society that fought 
against Russification, created by a group of Georgian intellectuals in 1987. In 1988, it was 
joined by new organizations including the Society of Saint Ilia the Righteous, which was 
led by Gamsakhurdia, and the National Democratic Party under the leadership of Georgi 
Chanturia. “Those two groups were considered as ‘radical’, because of their views 
considering the Soviet rule illegitimate, and their demand for Georgian independence, 
but also because of their uncompromising political positions, whereby any cooperation 
with the existing political order was regarded as morally unacceptable. Both groups 
would play a key role in later events” (ibid: 162).  
By the end of 1989, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was the undisputed leader of the Georgian 
nationalist movement. He shared personal animosities with a large number of the leaders 
of other nationalist organizations, however, which divided the Georgian national 
movement into two main fronts (Cheterian, 2008). Interestingly, their main point of 
contention was the institutional structure that should be at the foundation of Georgian 
independence. While some 6,200 representatives of 150 political groups and 
organizations formed the National Congress to negotiate Georgia’s secession, 
Gamsakhurdia set up the Free Georgia Round Table with which he competed in the 
Supreme Soviet parliamentary elections in October 1990. The Round Table recorded a 
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sweeping victory and came to dominate the parliament of the Supreme Soviet, occupying 
155 out of 250 seats (ibid). Receiving strong public support, Gamsakhurdia also won the 
presidential elections in May 1991 – but after just a few months in office, he had become 
an unpopular and politically isolated leader. Soon, neither the population nor the other 
factions within the Georgian separatist movement considered him their legitimate 
representative. He was overthrown in January 1992, after which the Military Council 
claimed power, recalled itself the State Council, and invited Eduard Shevardnadze, the 
former Soviet leader of Georgia, to return to power. Shevardnadze suffered from a 
severe  legitimacy problem, however, and Georgia continued to be divided between pro- 
and contra-Gamsakhurdia activists. Although it had the form of a state, Georgia lacked 
the legitimate institutions to provide for its substance. Making things worse, “chaotic 
political management led to the tragedy of war in Abkhazia, and the defeat of the 
Georgian forces with tragic human consequences” (ibid: 185). 
5.4.3 Service provision 
By the time of the Georgian invasion, Abkhazia was led by Vladislav Ardzinba, a former 
historian who had been elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia in 
December 1990. He soon moved to assert control over Soviet military units in Abkhazia, 
and further created a National Guard that was mono-ethnically Abkhaz (Cornell, 2002). 
In the war with Georgia, the Abkhaz forces “fought with determination and unity” 
(Derluguian, 2005), which translated into cohesion outside the battlefield. Military 
success under Ardzinba ensured the maintenance of unity within the separatist 
government’s institutional apparatus, and generated the popular support necessary for its 
expansion. The Abkhaz government first established the other necessary organs to 
ensure security within the region, such as police and a court system; later, it also built the 
capacities to provide some basic public services, including education and health care 
(Caspersen, 2008). This system of service provision still stands. As recognized by the 
International Crisis Group (2006: 3), the Abkhaz now “profess a proven ability to 
maintain a functioning government with a democratically elected president; a system 
based on the rule of law that protects the rights of minorities; an army that can defend its 
territory; and a growing economy that will assure the entity’s sustainability.”  
The service-related tasks of the Ardzinba government were facilitated much by 
Abkhazia’s existing socio-economic structure. The Abkhaz land is extremely fertile, 
ensuring its self-sufficiency in terms of food; in addition, it is endowed with several 
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hydroelectric plants that account for its energy security. As recognized by Cornell (2001: 
162), “These factors have helped the isolated Ardzinba regime to stay in power without 
much opposition.” Meanwhile, it is very dependent on external support to sustain the 
daily running of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Indeed, “The United 
Nations and international nongovernmental organizations, such as Acción Contra la 
Hambre, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Médecins Sans Frontières, 
have become the pillars of social security in Abkhazia” (Lynch, 2004: 44). The Abkhaz 
further rely on Russia to provide them with passports and pay local pensions (Caspersen, 
2008). Although the separatist institutions in Abkhazia are considerably weaker than 
those in Nagorno Karabakh, they have managed to keep up a façade of effective 
governance that is sufficient to prevent the emergence of challengers.  
Interestingly, the opposite was true in Georgia. With more than seventy political parties 
competing for power in 1990, the Georgian political sphere was characterized by internal 
bickering among different nationalist groups whose radical positions became increasingly 
incompatible (Cornell, 2002; Derluguian, 2005). As none of them felt responsible for the 
sustenance of the institutions and functions of the state, politics in Georgia became more 
and more deinstitutionalized (Zürcher, 2007). As explained by Derluguian (2005: 201), 
“Many Georgian officials themselves did not appear to behave like the organizers of 
economic production or providers of public goods – if anybody’s concern at all, things 
like the provision of electricity, roads, and schools were considered Moscow’s 
responsibility. Georgian officials often behaved more like old-fashioned gentry than 
managers and bureaucrats. The result was a particularly brittle state that would collapse 
instantaneously once its power stopped flowing from the central government and the 
population lost the last vestiges of fear or trust in the authorities.” With Moscow 
providing services to the Georgian population, there was no vacuum for the Georgian 
nationalist movement to exploit, and thus no room for a Georgian state-building project 
that the different nationalist factions could cohere around. This resulted in sustained 
internal fragmentation of the Georgian movement. 
5.4.4 State strength 
Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was in decay, its continued exercise of state 
functions implied that the Georgian nationalist movement lacked a window of 
opportunity for the establishment of a system of effective governance. The common 
cause of Georgian independence alone proved insufficient to unite the different 
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Georgian nationalist groups, as they “were [too] internally divided personally and 
ideologically to form a cohesive movement” (Cornell, 2002: 155). Indeed, rather than 
cohering around a single project, the different Georgian factions – that had formed 
around charismatic leaders and personal ties rather than a program – remained isolated, 
small groupings with only rudimentary internal organizational capacities (Zürcher, 2007). 
The resulting power struggle between them effectively led to a disastrous breakdown of 
law and order in Georgia. While there was no Georgian state army, paramilitary forces 
that to a large degree consisted of simple criminals prone to looting and pillaging were 
omnipresent (Cornell, 2002). Too preoccupied with its radical battle for political 
dominance, the Georgian national movement utterly failed to create a functioning, 
independent and democratic state (Cornell, 2002). Georgia’s fatal state weakness was the 
direct consequence “of a transition that could not be managed because the new ruling 
elites could not rule” (Zürcher, 2007: 147). 
Like in Azerbaijan, Georgia’s state weakness translated into military weakness; and like 
the Karabakh Armenians, the Abkhaz benefited directly from the resulting window of 
opportunity. The main struggle for political dominance was between Georgian president 
Eduard Shevardnadze and his predecessor, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. When the latter 
returned from exile to Georgia, “over a third of the Georgian forces deserted to support 
him, and the Abkhaz took this opportunity to resume their offensive” (Cornell, 2002: 
169). While the supporters of Gamzakhurdia took control of Georgian weapons and 
challenged Shevardnadze’s government militarily, launching a rebellion that threatened to 
plunge Georgia into complete chaos, the front in Abkhazia collapsed, allowing the 
Abkhaz forces to regain control over their territory (ibid). A Russian-brokered ceasefire 
entered into force in late October 1993, and it was followed up with an interim peace 
agreement in April 1994 (Cornell, 2001). In the absence of a functioning incumbent state, 
the Abkhaz have since consolidated their de facto independence . 
5.4.5 External support 
While there were no external actors supporting the nationalist cause of Georgia, the 
Abkhaz separatist movement has thrived on external support ever since the invasion of 
Georgia in the region. the ranks of Abkhazia’s armed forces were first of all swelled by 
volunteer units from the North Caucasus, primarily composed of Chechens and 
Circassians (Lynch, 2004; Cornell, 2002). In addition, Russian forces that were deployed 
in Abkhazia with the official purpose of mediating the cessation of hostilities offered 
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direct support to the separatists, providing both human and material assistance (Cornell, 
2002). “Officially, Russia was endeavoring to find a peaceful settlement in Abkhazia and 
denied any involvement in the war. But its policy of divide and rule included military 
support to both sides in the conflict, which, over the course of the conflict, increasingly 
favored the Abkhazians” (Zürcher, 2007: 141). Russia’s military presence thus served to 
offset the weakness of the numerically disadvantaged Abkhazians, while exacerbating the 
weakness of the fragmented Georgian forces. As such, the balance of power on the 
battleground was “clearly strengthened in favor of the separatists” (Lynch, 2004: 78). 
After the war had been decided in the favor of the Abkhaz, Russia stationed 
peacekeepers in the area that have continued to secure the Abkhaz government’s 
territorial control and prevented Georgia from engaging in attempts at violent 
reincorporation of Abkhazia. As the Abkhaz foreign minister bluntly put it, “The CIS9 
peacekeeping forces have de facto established a state border” (Lynch, 2004: 62). As 
mentioned earlier, the Abkhaz government further relies on the support of the United 
Nations and international humanitarian organizations to provide substance to its system 
of social service provision. Their financial and material assistance has served to 
strengthen the status quo (Lynch, 2004), providing legitimacy to the Abkhaz government 
and as such securing its representational monopoly. 
 
5.5 Cross-case comparison 
In the preceding sections, I presented three different cases to illustrate the variation on 
the independent variables under research in this thesis: service provision, the 
institutionalization of representation, external support, and state strength. The case 
studies of Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, and Abkhazia and Georgia provide observable 
support for all of the stated hypotheses, which I will illustrate with a brief cross-case 
comparison focusing on the causal mechanisms related to each individual hypothesis.  
 
H1: The more effective a separatist organization’s service provision, the lower the likelihood of 
fragmentation.  
As becomes clear from the different cases, the mechanism that translates service 
provision into cohesion is popular satisfaction. The separatist governments of Nagorno 
Karabakh and Abkhazia paid much attention to the needs of their population, and 
                                                 
9 CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States 
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satisfied the most basic requirement of security as well as other public goods. As a result, 
the Karabakh Armenians and the Abkhaz were very satisfied with the services provided 
by their relative separatist governments, and subsequently did not explore any 
alternatives. The Georgian government, on the other hand, felt no responsibility for 
service provision as this was a function fulfilled by Moscow. With only a common cause 
but no common responsibility, the Georgian nationalist movement remained severely 
fragmented. The Chechen government, too, largely neglected the provision of services 
from the outset. While it initially did provide security to its population, the Dudayev 
regime made no investments in other public goods, and over time the Chechens became 
increasingly unhappy with the absence of educational and health care facilities. In 
response, the Chechen population came to support the emergence of various 
oppositional organizations and encouraged them to challenge Dudayev’s rule. The lack of 
service provision by the Chechen government thus translated into a fragmented 
separatist movement, where the successful service provision by the Karabakh and 
Abkhaz governments resulted in cohesion.  
H2: The stronger the institutionalization of representation, the lower the likelihood of fragmentation. 
Relating to the institutionalization of representation, a similar pattern can be observed. 
The causal mechanism at work here is the acceptance by the population as well as 
different factions within the movement of the separatist government as their legitimate 
representative. In Nagorno Karbakh as well as in Abkhazia, the separatist authorities set 
up democratic institutions through which both popular and factional preferences could 
be taken into account (Caspersen, 2008). Because any differences could be expressed 
within these institutional structures, the population and factions within both countries 
accepted the legitimate representation of the government and had no reason to create 
alternative organizations. In Chechnya, on the other hand, the general acceptance of the 
separatist government as the representative of the Chechen people had more to do with 
the presence of an external threat than with the legitimacy of its governmental structures. 
The institutions and cohesion of the movement were therefore equally superficial and 
temporary. The Georgian government in turn represented neither the population nor the 
different factions within the movement. As its lack of legitimacy and sustained factional 
opposition continued to reinforce one another, it utterly failed to institutionalize 
representation and remained severely fragmented. 
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H3: The more external support, the lower the likelihood of fragmentation. 
The relevance of external support, then, results from it being an instrumental factor in 
the establishment of effective governance systems by separatists. As the evidence for the 
previous hypotheses shows, the successful establishment of such a system in turn tends 
to result in a cohesive movement. The Karabakh Armenians received the most extensive 
external support, from the Armenian state as well as its diaspora and international 
nongovernmental organizations. The Karabakh movement could therefore maintain the 
most elaborate system of government, and was also the most cohesive. The Abkhaz were 
also very cohesive, thanks to the effective system of governance it sustained with the 
support from external actors like the Russian government and international humanitarian 
organizations. The Chechens and Georgians received the least (if any) external support, 
and therefore did not manage to maintain a system of effective governance. These 
movements were also severely fragmented. 
H4: The weaker the state, the lower the likelihood of fragmentation.  
Lastly, the causal process that translates state weakness into separatist cohesion is the 
absence of a spoiler to the movement’s attempts at establishing an effective system of 
governance, which in turn facilitates cohesion. In both Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 
the implosion of the Soviet Union by default brought to power a government that was 
riven by an internal struggle for political dominance. This incumbent fragmentation 
created a window of opportunity for each of the separatist movements to establish a 
system of effective governance, but only the Karabakh Armenians and the Abkhaz took 
full advantage of this possibility and were subsequently able to maintain unity within their 
movements. The ineffective Chechen leadership instead deprived the movement of the 
means to set up such an effective governance system, and when the window of 
opportunity had closed, the strengthening Russian state could successfully spoil the 
cohesion of the Chechen separatist movement. The Georgian government in turn did 
not profit from the decay of the Soviet Union because its weakness did not create a 
vacuum in terms of effective governance. In the absence of a common responsibility, the 
Georgians failed to unite. 
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6 Conclusion 
Existing literature on movement fragmentation has generally focused on its effects, 
showing that internal cleavages affect strategies as well as outcomes in civil wars. These 
effects are only the final link in a longer causal chain, however, and are rooted in the 
character and causes of fragmentation. Thus far, scholars have largely neglected these 
earlier steps in the causal process. This thesis makes tentative steps towards filling this 
knowledge gap. I have presented an original framework that identifies the causes of 
fragmentation in separatist movements, hypothesizing that effective governance by the 
separatist government is key to the maintenance of unity within a movement. If a 
separatist government can provide both services and an institutional basis for 
representation, the population as well as the different factions in the separatist region will 
benefit more from association with the incumbent leadership of the movement than 
from founding or supporting oppositional organizations, thus resulting in the 
maintenance of cohesion within the movement. External actors such as other states, 
non-governmental organizations, and diaspora groups can facilitate the establishment of 
a system of effective governance by providing material and economic support. State 
weakness – particularly stemming from political fragmentation within the incumbent 
government – rather provides a window of opportunity for effective governance, as it 
tends to result in the absence of attempts at spoiling the secessionist state-building 
process. 
The omnipresence of state weakness in the cases under examination further implicated 
that the systems of effective governance established by those separatists with outside 
support turned out to be more satisfactory than the governance of the incumbent state. 
This result raises some important questions, however. Is it at all possible for a separatist 
movement in a strong state to remain cohesive? And can a separatist movement in any 
kind of state establish a system of effective governance without the help from external 
actors? Indeed, Mampilly (2011) has made a compelling argument for the 
acknowledgement of insurgent groups’ governance capacities, showing that they too can 
provide political and economic order. Nonetheless, non-recognition seems to remain a 
serious impediment to the consolidation of separatist institutions, and as such a tough 
challenge to the prevention of fragmentation within a separatist movement. On the other 
hand, once such institutional structures are in place, they prove hard to be torn apart. 
This has important policy implications for the incumbent state in its attempts to restore 
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its territorial integrity. While spoiling tactics are very effective at preventing the 
emergence of a system of governance, they tend to be counterproductive when such a 
system is already present, as the separatist government only enhances its legitimacy by 
portraying its flaws as a direct result of the incumbent state’s hostile policies. 
Lastly, this thesis has shed light on the ways in which the institutional legacy of the Soviet 
Union greatly affected the success of the separatist state-building projects within its 
territory, as well as the processes of cohesion and fragmentation within the movements 
executing them. This is an important addition to the existing literature on 
ethnofederalism, showing that it can generate not only interethnic tension, but also 
intragroup cohesion. Upon the Soviet  Union’s decay, its ethnofederalist institutional 
structures created a unique pattern of double state weakness that set the window of 
opportunity wide open for different ethnic groups within its territory to pursue 
independence. With both the Soviet Union and its successor states unable to perform key 
state functions, particularly those ethnic groups that had autonomy and were equipped 
with their own political institutions were in the perfect position to benefit from the 
emerging power vacuum, and establish a governance system capable of filling the void. 
The uniqueness of the Soviet institutional legacy also implies that all findings may only be 
applicable to a limited part of the world and a short period of time, however. The case 
studies of Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, and Abkhazia in its struggle with Georgia 
indeed provide compelling evidence showing that effective separatist institutions result in 
cohesive movements, but no firm conclusions can be drawn based on just three cases 
that are all positioned in the same post-Soviet context. Future research on the causes of 
fragmentation in separatist movements therefore has to examine a broader universe of 
cases to see if these findings also hold under different conditions, preferably making use 
of a more encompassing set of resources including native language texts and primary 
sources.  
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